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Tools of the Case Management in the First 




The dilatory behaviour of the parties and their lawyers is independent 
from age and geographical location since it arises always and everywhere 
for identical reasons.2 Case management has been recognised as essential 
to securing the right to a trial within a reasonable time in a number of 
European jurisdictions.3 As a result, judicial case management has 
become increasingly popular. Much of the control over the proceedings 
that was with the parties and their lawyers has over the last decades been 
transferred to the court.4 Increasing proceedings with a single judge, 
fewer hearings and adjournments and a better balance between written 
and oral proceedings, were among the central goals of the reforms.5 This 
tendency can be observed in Hungary as well since the main aim of the 
new Code of Civil Procedure of 2016 is to concentrate the proceedings, 
which has two addressees: the parties and the court. This means that on 
one hand, the parties are obliged to facilitate the proceeding and on the 
other hand, the role of the court was strengthened through the case 
management. This study examines the historical basics and tools of this 
latter legal institution in accordance with the first Hungarian Code of 
Civil Procedure, the Act I of 1911 enacted after almost thirty years of 
codification. The study is based not only on the legal literature but on the 
practice as well, which means that the decisions of the higher courts are 
also taken into consideration. I also analyse the legal practice of the code 
of summary procedure (Act XVIII of 1893) because the examined 
Sections were regulated identically in the two codes. 
 
Keywords: Act I of 1911; Act XVIII of 1893; case management; civil 
procedure; relationship between the parties and the court 
                                               
1This research was supported by the project nr. EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007, titled Aspects 
on the development of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, 
innovation networks in employment and digital economy. The project has been supported 
by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund and the budget of 
Hungary. 
2Czoboly (2013) at 9. 
3Uzelac (2017) at 7. 
4Verkerk (2007) at 27. 
5Nylund (2018) at 17. 
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Introduction to Case Management 
 
The Birth of the French Code of Civil Procedure and its effects 
 
The 19th century brought significant changes in the law of civil procedure 
based on the principles of orality, immediacy and the free evaluation of 
evidence. The codification of the French Code of Civil Procedure (Code de 
procédure civile) of 1806 was ‚the expression of a society and a political 
regime which meant to put the revolutionary years behind them, but 
without putting the clock entirely back to the era of the Ancien Régime.‛1 
The birth of the Code de procédure civile marked the beginning of the era 
of the so called passive judges, which left ‚its mark on the nineteenth 
century civil procedural law of almost all European states.‛2 For example, 
the German Code of Civil Procedure3 (Reichscivilprozeßordnung – still in 
force under the name of Zivilprozessordnung) of 1877 was intended to 
modernise the conduct of proceedings under French influence. The freedom 
of the private individual in regard to the state authorities, particularly to the 
law courts, was expressed in a series of separate provisions, for instance by 
the passive (or waiting) attitude of the court, since it only interfered with 
the procedure only to a small extent. State authorities took an active part 
only when the judgment was given.4 The procedure was dominated by the 
party-prosecution (Parteibetrieb), they could submit new arguments until 
the end of the last oral hearing (without any possibility of precluding 
arguments) and they could adjourn the proceedings without any reason.5 
 
A Different Way: The Austrian Model and its success in the Twentieth Century 
 
When the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure of 1895 took effect in 1898, 
the era of the rather passive judges ended.6 Perhaps the most perplexing 
                                               
1Wijffels (2005) at 25. 
2Van Rhee (2007) at 307. 
3After the Congress of Vienna of 1815, the left bank of the Rhine were annexed to Prussia, 
Bavaria and Hessen-Darmstadt. However, this territory was not integrated to the legal 
systems of these states and the Code de procédure civile remained in force until the 
Reichscivilprozeßordnung of 1877, so the influence of the French code came ’from within’. 
Oberhammer & Domej (2005) at 107. 
4Cohn (1934) at 73. 
5Gottwald (2004) at 147., Bettermann (1978) at 365-397. 
6Van Rhee (2007) at 307. 
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task which Franz Klein (‚the superb drafter of the Code‛)1 faced in 
drafting the Austrian Zivilprozessordnung was the delineation of functions 
of the court and the parties in a system intended to combine features of 
party-presentation and court-prosecution.2 Cappelletti featured this code 
as ‚extremely influential, more radically innovative‛3 than the German 
one. Klein advocated a stronger position for the judge in such a way that 
the parties remained in control of the initiation of the lawsuit and made 
decisions about its continuation and termination.4 While the parties were 
required to set forth truly all the facts serving for the support of their 
respective contentions and are permitted, through the court or by its 
permission, to question each other or each other's representatives, it is 
made the duty of the court, at the hearing, by questioning or otherwise, so 
to proceed that all relevant allegations be brought forward and all relevant 
facts disclosed.5 
The Austrian Zivilprozessordnung realised the idea that civil procedure 
is a social institution of the state (Sozialfunktion) where the judge should 
manage the case in a concentrated way to give a just judgment as early as 
possible.6 Klein sought to introduce measures designed to speed up 
proceedings, for example, the restriction of procedural objections, the 
limitation, if possible, to a single oral hearing, the shortening of time-limits 
and the prevention of the adjournment of the hearing by request of the 
parties.7 
The Austrian model dominated developments in jurisdictions throughout 
in the 20th century,8 including the Hungarian Code of 1911, the Norwegian 
Norwegian Code of 1915 and the Danish Code of 1916.9 For instance, the 
German Zivilprozessordnung was amended in 1909, 192410 and 1933,11 when 
the duty of the parties to give all particulars of the case and to tell the truth 
                                               
1Cappelletti (1971) at 858. 
2Homburger (1970) at 24. 
3Cappelletti (1971) at 854. 
4Van Rhee (2018) at 76. 
5Engelmann, Hermann, Millar & Schwartz (1927) at 636. 
6Gottwald (2004) at 148. 
7Oberhammer (2004) at 225. 
8Van Rhee (2018) at 76. 
9Cappelletti (1971) at 855. 
10Millar (1924) at 703-708. 
11The Code was also amended significantly in 1976. Gottwald (1997) at 753-766. 
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and gave the court the power to preclude arguments (of both parties) not 
presented in time in preparatory pleadings.1 
 
Defining Case Management  
 
Case management means the collection, the classification and the 
preparation of the materials of the proceeding by the court.2 According to 
Cabral, case management constitutes the early and continuous control 
over a judicial process and its proceedings in terms of efficiency, in order 
to enhance speed and quality, as well as to ensure compliance.3 
The parties are obliged to cooperate with the court. During the 
codification of the new Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure it was disputed 
whether the cooperation of the parties should be a basic principle or not. 
The legislation came to the result that such a principle is not necessary, 
since the plaintiff initiates a procedure because he/she could not cooperate 
with the defendant. According to King, ‚judicial case management requires 
lawyers and judge to act as a team in planning the case. The judge serves as 




The Main Features of the Act I of 1911 
 
The Act I of 1911 (hereinafter: The Code) was enacted by the Hungarian 
Parliament in 1910 after almost thirty years of codification. The creator of 
the Code, Sándor Plósz (Minister of Justice between 1899 and 1905) got a 
mandate in 1880 from the House of Representatives of the Parliament5 to 
participate in foreign studies, where he examined the new German Code 
                                               
1There are two fundamental differences between German and Anglo-American civil 
procedure, and these differences lead in turn to many others. First, the court rather than 
the parties' lawyers takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence. 
Second, there is no distinction between pretrial and trial, between discovering evidence 
and presenting it. Langbein (1985) at 826; Vorrasi (2004) at 375-379. 
2‚Die Sammlung, Gliederung und Aufbereitung des Prozessstoffes‚ Rechberger & 
Simotta (2017) at 360, Kodek & Mayr (2018) at 245. Endemann stated that is is ‚die Summe 
von Befugnissen des Richters.‚ Endemann (1868) at 474. 
3Cabral (2018) at 7. 
4King (1997) at 24. 
5Térfi (1915) at 2. 
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of Civil Procedure. His first draft of 18851 was influenced by the liberal 
German model, but after the enactment of the Austrian Zivilprozessordnung, 
our codification (as mentioned before) was affected by it. 
During the codification of the Code, the Act XVIII of 1893 on the 
summary procedure was enacted, which was considered to be a transition 
between the procedural orders of 1868 and 1911. Basically, it provided an 
opportunity to the courts to experience the procedure, which was based 
on oral hearings until the Parliament adopted the modern Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1911. The ministerial explanation also highlighted that ‚the 
adoption of the new legislative acts would suit the right judicial policy if 
the transition did not interfere with the order of jurisdiction (or minimised 
the interference to the lowest possible measure). The more definite the 
difference between the current and the new system, the greater the 
interference would be, which includes the interference in the judicial 
system itself as well.‛2 
Oberhammer emphasised that every legislator striving to speed up 
litigation had to decide whether ordinary procedure should be accelerated 
or special summary proceedings promising speedier handling of small 
claims or certain types of claims should be introduced alongside ordinary 
procedure3 This duality was perceptible in the 18th-19th century Europe as 
well (especially in the German legal systems). 
Oral hearings do not need the principle of contingent cumulation 
(Eventualmaxime), which was a necessary tool to avoid the protraction of 
the written procedure,4 since the statement of a party is followed by the 
opponent‘s immediate counter-statement, and the judge is able to control 
the process of the procedure with his case management. 
In the procedure based on the Act I of 1911 (and on the summary 
procedure), the court had a significant managerial role, however the 
managerial activity of the court could not be interpreted as taking of 
evidence ex officio. The parties should name and provide the evidence 
based on the questions of the court.5 Regarding the case management, the 
                                               
1Plósz (1885) at 1-160. 
2Ministerial explanation to the bill on the summary procedure at 46. 
3Oberhammer (2004) at 219-224. 
4For the Hungarian historical background of the principle of contingent cumulation, 
see Szivós (2019) at 79-89. 




chair of the court panel had such a significant role that ‚the fulfilment of 
the intention of the act‛ depended on him.1 
As a general rule, the chair of the court panel should care about the 
detailed discussion of the case. However, the hearing of the case should 
not be disturbed by ‘lengthiness’ and with such matter that did not belong 
to it and it should be finished in the same session (Section 224 subs 2 of the 
Code). 
The chair of the court panel should care about the vague requests, 
statements and declarations, the deficient statements and proofs and make 
sure the parties explain and complement them (Section 225 subs. 1 of the 
Code). In the procedure before the district courts, the judge had an 
additional obligation. He should warn the party without legal representative 
about the consequences of his actions or omission, the deadlines of any 
procedural remedy and the rules of representation (Section 225 subs. 4 of 
the Code). However, if the party had a legal representative, the court did 
not have to warn him.2 
 
 
The Case Management in the Act I of 1911 
 
The Difficulty of bounding the detailed Discussion and the Clarification 
 
There were two main tools of case management: the detailed discussion 
of the case and the clarification of the statements of the parties. However, 
they were very similar. For example, there was a judicial decision where 
the court declared the procedural violation based on Section 37 of the Act 
XVIII of 1893 (Section 225 of Act I of 1911) because the court did not search 
the basis of the claim.3 On the other hand, we could also say that the court 
did not discuss the case in details (Section 35 of Act XVIII of 1893; Section 
224 subs. 2 of Act I of 1911). 
When the chair of the panel cared about the vague requests, statements 
and declarations, the deficient statements and proofs and made sure the 
                                               
1Borsitzky (1915) at 83. 
2Decision no. II. G. 21/95. (12 June 1895) of the Royal Curia; decision no. II. G. 48/95. (11 
September 1895) of the Royal Curia; decision no. I. G. 44/96. (12 May 1896) of the Royal 
Curia; decision no. I. G. 214/96. (14 October 1896) of the Royal Curia; decision no. I. G. 531 
1900. (9 January 1901) of the Royal Curia; decision no. 1896. II. G 87. (18 December 1896) of 
the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of Budapest. 




parties explain and complement them, he also cared about the detailed 
discussion at the same time.1 
 
The Obligation to Clarify the Relevant Facts 
 
The clarification was a particular obligation of the court2 and had to be 
applied to the statement of claim as well since it was the base of the 
decision of the court.3 There is a central question in the new system of civil 
procedure in Hungary whether the statement of claim shall or shall not be 
clarified before communicating it with the defendant and not only 
scholars, but the jurisdiction is also divided in this debate. 
In a case, the plaintiff requested the court to adjudicate maintenance 
payment to a child, but just in general (without the specification of the time 
or duration). The claim was vague in the sense it did not specify whether 
the plaintiff wanted the payment from the birth of the child. However, the 
court omitted to clarify the vague statement of claim and interpreted it 
one-sided (as the plaintiff had asked from the birth). This procedure did 
not fulfil the requirements of the clarification.4 The court acted contrary to 
the basic principles of the Code when it held further hearings and 
recorded the statements without clarifying their vagueness. Neither the 
court of appeal nor the court of the review procedure could decide the 
case because of it.5 
To mention another legal dispute, the defendant admitted that he 
conducted a brokerage contract with the plaintiff, according to which the 
half of the revenue that he earns belongs to the plaintiff. The main dispute 
between them was whether the plaintiff could claim his part from the 
defendant only if the defendant got the money from the third parties he 
conducted a contract with or not. According to the general procedural 
rules, the parties could submit the facts and the proofs freely even in the 
appeal hearing. However, the court of the second instance did not discuss 
                                               
1The judicial decisions cited are mostly brought Royal Regional Courts of Appeal. They 
were the second highest courts in Hungary after the Royal Curia which had a significant 
role in unifying the jurisdiction in Hungary. Varga (2014) at 281-289. 
2Decision no. 1896. I. G. 11. (24 January 1896) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest. 
3Decision no. 1899. G. II. 3. (16 February 1899) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal 
of Győr. 
4Decision no. I. G. 298/97. (14 October 1897) of the Royal Curia. 
5Decision no. 1898. G. 16 of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of Kolozsvár. 
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the details of this disputed agreement of the parties. As a result, the court 
of the review procedure could not make a decision in the case.1 
 
Questioning the Parties 
 
The most typical form of clarification was the questioning. Apart from 
the members of the court panel, the parties also had the opportunity to file 
motions to ask questions. The court decided about the permissibility of the 
question (Section 225 subs. 2 of the Code). 
The main boundaries of the questioning were the principles of free 
disposition (Dispositionsmaxime) and the ‚party control over allegations 
and proofs‛2 (Verhandlungsmaxime). The right of questioning could not be the 
tool of judicial investigation. The court could practise this right only to 
those facts and proofs which were submitted by the parties (e.g. when the 
opponent did not declare about a statement it was too general or the 
verbal statement opposed with the statement of the preparatory 
document).3 
In case of deficient statements, the principle of free disposition was the 
main standard. For example, the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest set aside a judgment of the court of second instance because the 
defendant did not make a statement in a decisive fact and he was not 
questioned about it. The clarifying activity had to be recorded either in the 
minutes of the hearing or in the judgment.4 
 In a case the defendant was represented by a licensed attorney. As a 
main rule, formal defence (when the defendant requests the termination of 
the proceeding) had to be proposed during the preparatory hearing.5 The 
defendant did not submit such defence until the appeal hearing, but then 
his motion was upheld by the court and the procedure was terminated. 
                                               
1Decision no. 1896. II . 35. (5 June 1896) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of Budapest. 
2This is the English definition of the Verhandlungsmaxime given by Van Rhee (2007) at 312. 
Cohn and Meyer defined it as the ‚principle of party presentation.‛ See Cohl & Meyer 
(1952) at 38. 
3Kovács (1927) at 596-597.; Kengyel (2003) at 178. 
4Decision no. 1899. II. G. 90. (23 November 1899) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest. 
5In case of the summary procedure of 1893, it had to be proposed in the first hearing. In 
case of the pleas, the principle of contingent cumulation (Eventualmaxime) was applied, so 
if the defendant did not propose all the reasons serving as a ground for the termination of 
the procedure together, he did not have the opportunity to do so anymore. See Szivós 
(2019) at 88-89. 
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The Royal Curia rejected the formal defence, and a repeated appeal hearing 
had to be held. Since did not raise such a plea which had to be taken into 
consideration ex officio (without the request of the party), the court was not 
obliged to inform the defendant about these pleas because he was 
represented by a licensed attorney.1 In contrary, the court had to inform the 
parties about actions which might be taken ex officio, even if they had a legal 
representative. 
Regarding the vague statements, the principle of party presentation 
was the boundary of questioning because it could only refer to those 
circumstances and statement of facts which were stated by the parties.2 
The Code did not mention, but the courts had to clarify the statements if 
they were controversial,3 since these statements also belonged to the 
category of vagueness. 
The principles of free disposition and party representation were also 
important in case of the detailed discussion. For instance, if the court did 
not discuss the relevant circumstances which related to the complaint of 
review, then it was a procedural violation.4 In the complaint, the complainer 
details the grievances which he wishes to be discussed by the court. When 
the court did not examine it, not only did it infringe the rule of detailed 





To sum up the aforementioned, when the court did not clarify the case 
(i.e. the relevant facts) or discussed it in details, it meant a procedural 
violation which could result in the setting aside of the judgment if the case 
could not be decided without these certain facts.5 However, it was not 
                                               
1Decision no. I. H. 30/1900. (30 December 1909) of the Royal Curia. 
2Decision no. 1895. III. G. 22. (27 June 1895) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest; decision no. 1896. II. G. 61. (16 October 1896) of the Royal Regional Court of 
Appeal of Budapest.; decision no. 1897. G. 73. (27 December 1897) of the Royal Regional 
Court of Appeal of Marosvásárhely. 
3Decision no. 1899. I. G. 359. (22 February 1900) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest.; decision no. 1900. G. 1. (20 February 1900) of the Royal Regional Court of 
Appeal of Marosvásárhely. 
4Decision no. 1896. I. G. 154. (25 September 1896) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
Budapest. 
5Decision no. 1896. I. G. 165. (24 September 1896) of the Royal Regional Court of Appeal of 
of Budapest; decision no. 1896. I. G. 154. (25 September 1896) of the Royal Regional Court 
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necessary if the procedural violation could be remedied by the amendment 
of the judgment. 
The detailed discussion and the clarification were two very similar 
tools of the case management. We see from the judicial decisions that court 
treated the detailed discussion as a general rule of the case management 
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